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NOTES AND COMMENTS

NOTE: CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
OF SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS
The development of Sunday Closing
Laws may be traced through the institutions of the Roman empire,' England and
the American colonies. 3 At present, they
constitute a highly complex and controversial element of our statutory law. 4 In
America, after the adoption of our constitutional system, these laws gradually gave
rise to a number of serious problems and
their reconciliation with the individual freedoms secured in the Bill of Rights and
similar guarantees of the state constitutions has been a fruitful source of litigation
for more than a century. 5
This note will attempt to draw a comparison between the traditional position of
the courts on the constitutional issues created by the enforcement of the Sunday
Laws, and the current judicial attitude, as
expressed by the Supreme Court in four
cases6 recently before it. An effort will also
be made to evaluate the impact of these
1

See

JOHNSON & YOST, SEPARATION

AND STATE 219
2 Id. at 223.

OF CHURCH

(2d ed. 1948).

3 Id. at 224-26.
4 For an indication of the complexity of these

laws see the table contained in Appendix II of
the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 551
(1961). See also Comment, 59 COLUM. L. REV.
1192 n.6 (1959).
5 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 435
(1961).
6 McGowan v. Maryland, supra note 5; Gallagher

cases on the particular area of constitutional law with which they are concerned.
From the earliest times to the present,
Sunday Laws have been subjected to at7
tack along three principal lines:
(1) That they are laws directly promoting the establishment of Christianity,
(2) That they impair the right of free
exercise of religion, and,
(3) That they are discriminatory, class
legislation, and constitute a denial of equal
protection of the law.
Originally these objections were raised on
the state level.8 However, they eventually
v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., Inc., 366 U.S. 617
(1961); Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
7 They have at times been challenged on other
grounds. For example it has been asserted that
their terminology, especially in connection with
the designation of exempted products and business activities is vague and misleading; that they
constitute an unwarranted interference with the
personal habits of citizens; that they deprive individuals of liberty and property without due
process of law; and, in an early case, that they
violated the "privileges and immunities" clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Broad-Grace
Arcade Corp. v. Bright, 48 F.2d 348 (E.D. Va.),
afl'd, 284 U.S. 588 (1931) (per curiam); Justesen's Food Stores, Inc. v. City of Tulare, 12
Cal. 2d 324, 84 P.2d 140 (1938); Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502 (1858); State ex rel. Walker v.
Judge of Section A, 39 La.Ann. 132, 1 So. 437
(1887). Nevertheless, the categories enumerated
in the text seem to cover the most basic areas of
litigation.
8 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940),
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found their way into the federal courts
where they have become a vital and controversial aspect of current law.
Sunday Laws as an Establishment
of Religion
During the colonial period and afterwards, until approximately the end of the
eighteenth century, the primary scope of
the Sunday Laws in this country remained
a basically religious one.9 Although this
orientation became much less marked in
the 1800's, 10 decisions reaffirming the religious purposes of these laws continued to
appear. 1 Yet, during the nineteenth century, the early approach which gave recognition to the religious foundation of Sunday
closing legislation but sustained it nevertheless, gave way to the secular outlook
which has pervaded the thinking of the
courts in this century. 12 This shift was the
result of repeated attacks against the blue
laws based on the anti-establishment provisions incorporated into many of the state
made the religious guaranties of the first amendment applicable to the states. Before this, the
"establishment" and "free exercise" issues could
generally be raised only in the state courts. See
Comment, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1192, 1196
(1959).
9 See Note, 73 HARV. L. REV. 729, 730 (1960).
10 See, e.g., Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 679, 68485 (1861); Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387,
392 (1853).
11 See, e.g., Kilgour v. Miles, 6 G. & J. 268 (Md.
1834); Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 S. & R. 48 (Pa.
1817).
12 This secular outlook, although it dominated the
thinking of the state courts in the nineteenth century, was not universally accepted. Some courts
clung to the old approach. See Brimhall v. Van
Campen, 8 Minn. 1 (1862). "This Sunday act
can have no other object than the enforcement of
the fourth of God's commandments, which are a
recognized and excellent standard of both public
and private morals." Id. at 5. See also Ex parte

constitutions."3 The state courts came to
rely almost exclusively upon the rationale
that the Sunday Laws, apart from what
may have been their former religious orientation, could be effectively sustained as
exercises of the police power. 14 It was reasoned that the progressing industrialization
of society had created the danger of degradation and degeneration among the
working classes through the vitiating effects
of incessant labor in factories, mines and
the like. To protect its citizens from these
dangers, the state might well exercise its
general police power to prohibit labor and
the carrying on of business for one day in
the week. 15 The fact that the day chosen
by the legislature, in its discretion, might
coincide with the religious Sabbath of the
Christian sects could not detract from the
prohibition as a legislative exercise of an
16
acknowledged power.
Koser, 60 Cal. 177, 194 (1882).
13 See, e.g., Frolickstein v. Mayor of Mobile, 40
Ala. 725, 727-28 (1867); Bloom v. Richards, 2
Ohio St. 387, 390 (1853).
14 State ex rel. Walker v. Judge of Section A, 39
La. Ann. 132, 1 So. 437 (1887): "There exists a
remarkable consensus of authority that the establishment of a compulsory day of rest in each week
is a legitimate exercise of the police power." Id.
at -, I So. at 443.
15 Swann v. Swann, 21 Fed. 299 (C.C.E.D. Ark.
1884). "Experience has shown the wisdom and
necessity of having, at stated intervals, a day of
rest from customary toil and labor for man and
beast. It renews flagging energies, prevents premature decay, promotes the social virtues, tends
to repress vice, aids and encourages religious
teachings and practice, and affords an opportunity for innocent and healthful amusement and
recreation." Id. at 303. See also Lindenmuller v.
People, 33 Barb. 548 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861); Ex
parte Hodges, 65 Okla. Crim. 69, 83 P.2d 201
(1938).
16 Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 679 (1861).
"[T]hat the closing of shops on that day might
be more convenient to Christians, or might advance their religious aims or views, is no reason
for holding the law unconstitutional." Id. at 684.

7
'With the application of the first amendment to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, 17 the
same objection raised against the blue laws
in the state courts (i.e., that they were establishments of religion) was leveled
against them in the federal courts.' 8 But
the efforts to topple the Closing Laws on
this ground failed completely. 19 The same
approach adopted by the state courts was
also followed in the federal jurisdiction. As
far as the first amendment's prohibition
against the establishment of religion was
concerned, the cases took the view that the
Sunday Laws had long since ceased to be
religious establishments; that they constituted valid police regulations, discretionary
with the state legislatures, and that, however unsound they might be as policy measures, they fell well within the constitutional
20
bounds of the first amendment.
Pronouncements by the Supreme Court
as to the validity of the Sunday Laws, especially in regard to their ability to withstand attack, based on the establishment
concept, had, up until the present, been
both infrequent and inconclusive. 21 The
Court did, however, in Soon Hing v. Crowley, 22 Hennington v. Georgia23 and Petit v.
Minnesota,24 speak with approval of the
police power theory of the Sunday Laws,
despite the fact that none of these cases
squarely presented the issue of establishSee note 8 supra.
18 See Crown Kosher Super Mkt., Inc. v. Gallagher, 176 F. Supp. 466 (D. Mass. 1959), rev'd,
366 U.S. 617 (1961).
17

19 See McGowan v. Maryland, 220 Md. 117, 151
A.2d 156 (1959), afl'd, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
20 Ibid.
21 See Comment, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1192, 119899 (1959).
22 113 U.S. 703 (1885).
23 163 U.S. 299 (1896).
24 177 U.S. 164 (1900).
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ment or of free exercise of religion, which
will be discussed below. 25 On the other
hand, McGowan v. Maryland,20 Two Guys
From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 27 Braunfeld v. Brown 28 and Gallagher
v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., Inc.,29 have
been the occasion for a direct and unequivocal rejection by the Court of the position
that Sunday Laws are unconstitutional establishments of religion. In these cases,
the Court has closely identified itself with
the traditional view of the state courts
which rest their sustention of the Sunday
Laws on the recognition of a basic turn
about in their historical evolution from the
avowed promotion and preservation of
the Christian Sabbath to the insurance of
the secular well-being of workers through
30
mandatory periodical rest from labor.
These holdings have reconciled state Sunday legislation with the federal establishment doctrine as set forth in Everson v.
Board of Educ.,3x McCollum v. Board of
Educ.32 and Zorach v. Clauson33 and seem
to have determined conclusively that the
existence of blue laws is compatible with
25 The cases mentioned in the text involved (1) an
attempt to have a San Francisco fire control regulation struck down, (2) an attack against a
Georgia closing law as an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce and (3) an effort
to have a Minnesota Sunday Law regarding barber shops declared unconstitutional as violative of
equal protection.
26 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
27 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
28 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
29 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
30 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431-45
(1961); Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 592-98 (1961);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961);
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., Inc., 366
U.S. 617, 624-30 (1961).
31330 U.S. 1 (1947).
32 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
33 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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the maintenance of " 'a wall of separation
between church and State.' 34
Free Exercise of Religion
Even assuming that the state in the exercise of its general police power may enact
legislation prohibiting labor and the carrying on of business on Sunday, a further
problem arises where the exercise of governmental power actually or apparently
conflicts with the constitutional right of
individuals to free exercise of religion. A
consideration of the incipient religious
scope of the Sunday Laws re-emphasizes
the problem. Objections of this type have
been strenuously pressed by religious minorities, such as Jews and Seventh Day
Adventists, who observe religious Sabbaths
other than Sunday. 35 A Jewish businessman, for example, who is required by his
religious convictions to close down his
business on Saturday and in addition is
compelled by the state to do the same on
Sunday, finds that for all practical purposes his work week is reduced to five days.
On the other hand his Christian competitor, who already observes Sunday as his
religious Sabbath, is free to do business for
six days a week and finds himself the
beneficiary of a considerable economic advantage over the religiously conscientious
Jew. As a result, those of the Jewish faith
feel that the state is placing a penalty on
the exercise of their religion by forcing
34 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16

(1947).

them into a situation where they must sacrifice their religious convictions in order to
compete effectively with their Christian
3
counterparts. ,
The historical development of this issue
parallels that of the establishment controversy in that it was originally raised in the
state courts and became prominent in the
federal courts only with the application of
the first amendment to the state governments. 37 Again, as in the case of the establishment controversy, the state courts
almost without exception sustained the blue
laws as not impairing the right of free
exercise.38 Having discarded the old notion
that these laws could be justified as religious legislation3 9 and having laid a more
satisfactory foundation in the state's police
power, 40 the courts reasoned that the
choice of a particular day or period to
implement the policy of mandatory rest
from labor was a matter of discretion with
the legislature. 41 If the choice made happened to work hardship upon certain reli36See Note, 73 HARV. L. REV. 729, 733-35
(1960).
37 See Comment, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1192, 1196

(1959).

See, e.g., Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. 548
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861); Ex parte Koser, 60 Cal.
177 (1882); Judefind v. State, 78 Md. 510, 28
At. 405 (1894); Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa.
312 (1848); State v. Grabinski, 33 Wash. 2d 603,
206 P.2d 1022 (1949). The only case in state
courts striking down a Sunday Law on religious
grounds seems to have been Ex parte Newman,
38

9 Cal. 502 (1858). But that case was overruled
shortly after by Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 679
(1861). See Comment, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1192,

A number of jurisdictions give exemptions to
Jews and others who observe a day other than
Sunday as their Sabbath. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-303 (1960); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4301
(1956); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 436.160 (1955);
ME.REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 134 § 44 (1954); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 18.855 (1957); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3773.24 (Baldwin 1960); VA. CODE ANN.

201 (1938). "It is beyond the power of the legislature to impose the observance of Sunday as a
religious duty." Id. at -, 83 P.2d at 203.
40 See JOHNSON & YOST, SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE 231 (2d ed. 1948).
41
Lane v. McFadyen, 259 Ala. 205, 66 So. 2d 83

§ 18.1-359 (1960).

(1953); Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502 (1858)

35

1196 (1959).
39 Ex parte Hodges, 65 Okla. Crim. 69, 83 P.2d

7
gious minorities; that fact could not militate
against the laws since any conflict which
might exist would be the result not of the
state's prohibition but of the religious convictions of the minorities themselves. 42 It

was emphasized that the Sunday Laws were
wholly negative in character; that is, they
merely prohibited certain acts wholly secular in nature. 43 In no instance did. they
prohibit the performance of religious duties 44 or compel adherence to the tenets of
45
any religious sect.
In interpreting provisions of the state
constitutions guaranteeing the right to free
exercise of religion, the state courts found
a convenient source of support in the provisions' history. At the time of their adoption, it was reasoned, Sunday Laws had
long been in effect, thus their existence
could not have been considered inconsistent with the right to free exercise of
religion.

46

(dissenting opinion); State v. Diamond, 56 N.D.
854, 219 N.W. 831 (1928).
42 See Corporation
of Minden v. Silverstein
& Dittmer, 36 La. Ann. 912 (1884). "He [the
Jewish businessman] is left the absolute and unrestrained freedom of disposing of Saturday, his
Sabbath, as he may deem proper, or to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience. He is not . . . required to observe the
Christian Sabbath, and he is not checked in his
right to pursue other avocations.... ".Id. at
914-15.
43
Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 679, 684-85 (1861).
44
State v. Grabinski, 33 Wash. 2d 603, 206 P.2d
1022 (1949). "No one is restricted in his religious
beliefs or practices.
Id. at -, 206 P.2d at
1025.
45 People v. Friedman, 302 N.Y. 75, 96 N.E.2d
184 (1950), appeal dismissed, 341 U.S. 907
(1951) (want of a substantial federal question).
"It does not set up a church, make attendance
upon religious worship compulsory . . . provide
compulsory support, by taxation or otherwise, of
religious institutions, nor in any way enforce or
prohibit religion." Id. at -, 96 N.E.2d at 186.
46 See Judefind v. State, 78 Md. 510, 28 Atd. 405
(1894); cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
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The Supreme Court has adopted this
47
view of the free exercise conflict in 'toto.
As far as the choice of Sunday by the state
legislatures in the implementation of their
policies is concerned, the Court begins its
evaluation with the proposition that such
a choice, based on the police power, does
not violate the right to free exercise of
religion 48 and cannot be set aside unless it
may be characterized as unreasonable. 49 In
sustaining the choice the Court pointed out
that the state may legitimately seek to set
apart a day which all the members of the
family and community at large may enjoy
together,50 amid quiet and disassociation
from the everyday intensity of commercial
activities. 51 Furthermore, in the opinion of
420, 437-40 (1961).
47
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961);
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., Inc., 366
U.S. 617 (1961).
4s Braunfeld v. Brown, supra note 47. In Braunfeld the Court indicates that statutory exemptions
such as are given to Jews and Seventh Day Adventists in some jurisdictions are not required to
sustain the statutes' constitutionality. Such exemptions, the Court points out, may well provide
religious minorities with undesirable economic
advantages. See Kislingbury v. Treasurer of City
of Plainfield, 10 N.J. Misc. 798, 160 AtI. 654
(C.P. 1932). The Court also emphasizes the traditional distinction made in the area of religious
liberty between the absolute right to believe,
which is not subject to restriction and the qualified right to act upon one's convictions, which is
subject to regulation. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333 (1890); United States v. Kissinger, 250
F.2d 940 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958
(1958); Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church
Corp., 210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 1013 (1954).
49 Braunfeld v. Brown, supra note 47, at 607-09.
The Court lists a number of considerations which
tended to point up the reasonableness of the particular Sunday legislation under consideration
there.
50 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450-53
(1961).
51 Ibid.
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the Court, any attempt by the states to
apply the legislative theory of the Closing
Laws by allowing a choice to each individual on a "rest one day in seven" basis
would result in serious enforcement problems, which state legislatures do well to
avoid.5 2 As a result, we may fairly conclude
that on the free exercise issue as well as
on the establishment issue, the Supreme
Court has squarely aligned itself with the
traditional view of the state courts.
Equal Protection of Law
Despite the fact that Sunday Laws have
been sustained overwhelmingly against the
contentions that they are establishments of
religion and that they violate the right to
free exercise of religion, they have been
subjected to further attack based on the
concept of equal protection of law. In this
respect, the laws have not fared nearly as
well as in the other areas and have, not
infrequently, been struck down as discriminatory and arbitrary.5 3 Unlike the religious issues discussed above, the equal
protection controversy found its way into
the federal courts at an early date through
the explicit provisions of the fourteenth
54
amendment.
Both because of general policy considerations and the pressures brought to bear by
various economic groups, 55 the Sunday
Laws have developed, from the early simple and categorical prohibitions of labor
and business transactions, into a highly
52

Ibid.

53 See State v. Hurliman, 143 Conn. 502, 123

A.2d 767, 770 (1956), in which the court mentions several cases holding invalid various Closing
Laws on this ground.
54 See Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703

(1885).
55

See Note, 12

(1958).

RUTGERS

L. REv. 505, 508-09

complex system of exemptions and exceptions."6 Characteristically, a modern Sunday Law, after reciting its general ban
against labor and business not qualifying
as either necessary or charitable, will list
certain articles of merchandise or businesses which are not subject to the statute's
57
provisions.
As a result of this system of exemptions,
situations frequently arise in which a particular dealer (such as a grocer) who does
not qualify for a statutory exemption will
be prohibited from selling some specific
item (such as confectionary) which another dealer qualifying for an exemption
(a druggist, for example) will be permitted
to sell without restriction. 8 It has been
objected that statutory provisions which
make possible such a set of circumstances
are discriminatory and violate the right to
equal protection of law.
In dealing with this problem, the state
courts and the Supreme Court have adopted
the same basic approach.5 9 A crucial element in this regard has been the concept
of judicial restraint. The courts apparently
have proceeded on a presumption of constitutionality in their consideration of the
statutory classifications commonly incorporated into the Closing Laws. 60 Generally,
56 Crown Kosher Super Mkt., Inc. v. Gallagher,

176 F. Supp. 466 (D. Mass. 1959), rev'd, 366
U.S. 617 (1961).

"The result . . . is that the

Sunday law, as it now exists on the books, is an
almost unbelievable hodgepodge." Id. at 472.
57 See Note, supra note 55, at 506 n.9.
58 See Elliott v. State, 29 Ariz. 389, 242 Pac. 340
(1926).
59 See, e.g., Gundaker Central Motors, Inc. v.
Gassert, 23 N.J. 71, 127 A.2d 566 (1956), appeal
dismissed, 354 U.S. 933 (1957) (want of a substantial federal question); McGowan v. Maryland,
220 Md. 117, 151 A.2d 156 (1959), afl'd, 366
U.S. 420 (1961).
60 McGowan v. Maryland, supra note 59, at -,

151 A.2d at 159.

7
the determinations of the state legislatures
in this connection will not be questioned
regarding their advisability as policy measures and will be set aside only because of
gross, unjustifiable discrimination or arbitrariness. 61 In coping with the problem of
just how far legislative discrimination can
be carried without constituting an abuse of
discretion, the courts have evolved a number of subsidiary concepts. For example,
some courts have stated flatly that legislative discrimination between classes is permissible and that the right to equal
protection is violated only where the legislature begins to discriminate between individual members of a given class.6 2 Some
courts, on the other hand, have approached
the prob!em from the point of view of a
"stores-product" distiiction, 63 reasoning
that it is permissible for the legislature to
impose a blanket prohibition upon the sale
of a given product, whereas it would be
violative of equal protection to prohibit
certain designated stores from selling that
product without restricting all other stores
64
in the same manner.
Despite what may be described as the
general reluctance of the courts to strike
down Sunday Laws as discriminatory class
legislation, 65 they have not hesitated to do
Lane v. McFadyen, 259 Ala. 205, 66 So. 2d 83
(1953); Komen v. City of St. Louis, 316 Mo. 9,
289 S.W. 838 (1926); State v. Weddington, 188
N.C. 643, 125 S.E. 257 (1924); State v. Diamond,
56 N.D. 854, 219 N.W. 831 (1928).
62 See, e.g., State v. Towery, 239 N.C. 274, 79
S.E.2d 513, appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 925
61

(1954) (want of a substantial federal question).
63 State v. Grabinski, 33 Wash. 2d 603, 206 P.2d
1022 (1949). "As long as the legislature limits
its exceptions to specific commodities, such enact-

ments are almost universally upheld." Id. at -,
206 P.2d at 1024.
64 See State v. Hurliman, 143 Conn. 502, 123
A.2d 767 (1956).
65
Supra note 61.
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so where they felt such action was called
for. Thus, in Elliott v. State,66 the court
declared unconstitutional a Sunday Closing
Law which prohibited the opening of grocery, shoe and hardware stores on Sunday
while exempting jewelers, dealers in second-hand goods, and tailoring establishments. 7 Similarly, in Arrigo v. City of
Lincoln,68 the court held invalid a statute
which forbade the opening of grocery and
meat stores but excepted cigar stores, fruit
69
stores and others.
As already pointed out, the Supreme
Court has adopted fundamentally the same
attitude as the state courts in this area. In
Petit v. Minnesota,70 the Court upheld a
state Sunday Law which contained the traditional exemption for labor or business
activity, qualifying as "necessities," but explicitly designated the operation of barber
shops as being beyond the contemplation
of the statutory exemption. 71 The Court
perceived a sufficient basis for singling out
barber shops in the considerable difficulty
which might be attendant upon any effort
to classify their operation as necessary or
unnecessary. Basically, the case reaffirmed
the "wide discretion" possessed by the state
legislatures in these matters and redefined
the palpable arbitrariness required to set
aside legislative classifications contained in
the blue laws. 72 In McGowan, 73 the Court
pointed out that a statutory classification in
64 29 Ariz. 389, 242 Pac. 340 (1926).
67 Id. at 342.
68 154 Neb. 537, 48 N.W.2d 643 (1951).
69 1d. at 647. See also Justesen's Food Stores v.
City of Tulare, 12 Cal. 2d 324, 84 P.2d 140
(1938); Allen v. City of Colorado Springs, 101
Colo. 498, 75 P.2d 141 (1937); McKaig v. Kansas
City, 363 Mo. 1033, 256 S.W.2d 815 (1953).
70 177 U.S. 164 (1900).
71 Id. at 168.
72 Id. at 165-68.
73 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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this area will be nullified only if it "rests
on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. '7 4 The equal
protection concept is described there as not
necessarily making mandatory territorial
uniformity but only implying "equality be75
tween persons as such."
Conclusion
Clearly, Sunday closing legislation has
received the overwhelming endorsement of
both state and federal courts. 76 In its recent re-evaluation of these laws, the Supreme Court has undoubtedly been influenced to a large extent by the marked
concurrence of authority in this area. 77 At
any rate, the majority of the Court has
appropriated in its entirety the traditional
police power theory of the Sunday Laws
developed by the state courts during the
last century. Despite the vigorous position
of the dissenters on the free exercise issue, 78 both that issue and the establishment issue seem to have been settled definitively. Although the Court declares that
Sunday Laws may yet constitute a violation
of the establishment clause if they can be
demonstrated to incorporate a use of the
79
state's coercive power in aid of religion,
Id. at 425.
75 Id. at 427. See also Two Guys From Harrison74

Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt.,
Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
76 See cases cited note 75 supra. See also Comment, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 1192, 1196 (1959).
77 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 436

(1961). The Court here refers explicitly to the
wide authority sustaining Sunday Closing Legislation.
78 McGowan v. Maryland, supra note 77, at 561
(dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.); Braunfeld v.
Brown, supra note 75, at 616 (dissenting opinion
of Stewart, J.).
79 McGowan v. Maryland, supra note 77, at 453.

it remains highly doubtful that such a demonstration can be realistically attempted in
light of the Court's liberal interpretation of
those Sunday Laws presently in force 8 °
And so long as this is true, there seems to
be little possibility of having blue laws
struck down as unconstitutional infringements of the right to free exercise of
religion.
On the other hand, both the traditional
approach"' and the Court's present attitude
regarding the Closing Laws as violative of
equal protection may be characterized as
largely ad hoc determinations. Perhaps, in
light of the Court's sympathetic interpretation of the Maryland and Massachusetts
statutes in McGowan v. Maryland 2 and
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt.,
Inc.,8 3 this ad hoc characterization may
prove more apparent than real in the federal jurisdiction since successful assaults
against the Sunday Laws have been restricted to the equal protection area. 4 Any
change in this pattern seems highly remote,
if not impossible, at this time. With regard
to the status of the Closing Laws as implements of public policy operating within the
framework of our modern social and economic structures, the question of modification or abolition seems to have been
withdrawn emphatically from the area of

80 For a summary of Sunday Laws currently operative throughout the United States, see Appendix II of the separate opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in McGowan v. Maryland supra note
77, at 551.
81 Lane v. McFadyen, 259 Ala. 205, 66 So. 2d 83
(1953). "The decisions have been as varied as the
statutes or ordinances on which the actions arose.
"Id. at -, 66 So. 2d at 87.
...
82 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
83 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
84 See discussion and cases collected in note 38,
supra.

7
judicial determination. 5 If Sunday closing
legislation is a dying relic of the past, it
now appears that it will have to die where
it was born - in the state legislatures.
NOTE: A DAILY PRAYER FOR
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Ever since the Supreme Court stated
that our Constitution provides for "a wall
of separation between church and State" 1
the courts have been faced with the delicate
prob!em of establishing boundaries. In facing this issue recently, Chief Judge Desmond wrote for the New York Court of
Appeals, in Engel v. Vitale,2 that "there
is no problem of constitutionality"5 in allowing public, school teachers to offer the
following daily prayer, recommended by
the New York State Board of Regents to
local school authorities:
Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy bless-ings upon us, our parents, our teachers and
4
our Country.

The establishment and free exercise
clauses of the first amendment, which
petitioners claimed prohibited the Regents
Prayer, have proven standard weapons in
the arsenals of all opponents of prayer,
See State v. Kidd, 167 Ohio St. 521, 150 N.E.2d
413 (1958). "Whether in this fast-moving modern
age the Sunday closing law is outmoded, obsolete
and unrealistic and should be eradicated is essentially a legislative and not a judicial problem."
Id. at -, 150 N.E.2d at 419.
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Bible reading, singing of hymns, early release programs, wearing of religious garb
by teachers, and similar controversial
school board action. Thus far, the Supreme
Court has remained silent on the constitutionality of these acts as performed within
the public schools.5 Certiorari, however,
was requested in the present case. A decision by that Court on Engel v. Vitale, a
case which raises the very essence of the
constitutional issues involved, is likely to
play a significant role in establishing the
future relationship between Church and
State.
The purpose of this note is first, to explore the position other jurisdictions have
assumed in prayer recitation, Bible reading (the most common fact pattern giving
rise to these issues) and other situations,
and secondly, to divine from the most allied
of Supreme Court decisions the course that
Court may be expected to follow when
confronted with Engel v. Vitale.
Attitudes of the Several States
Noncompulsory prayers offered in the
presence of school children have for many
years survived cries of unconstitutionality
in most jurisdictions. In a Kentucky case, 6
for example, decided just after the turn of
the century, the court's opinion clearly in-
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1 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878).
2
Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 176 N.E.2d
579, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1961).
3Id. at 182, 176 N.E.2d at 582, 218 N.Y.S.2d
at 662.
4 Id. at 179, 176 N.E.2d at 580, 218 N.Y.S.2d
at 660.

5 See Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429
(1952), in which the petitioners attempted to
have declared as invalid a statute allowing daily
readings from the Old Testament. One of the
petitioners relied on the injury to his interest as a
taxpayer and the second sued as the parent of a
public school child. As to the first, the Court held
there was no case or controversy because the
facts were insufficient to support a claim of injuries to financial interest; as to the second petitioner, the Court ruled that the question was moot
since the child had graduated. .
6 Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School Dist., 120
Ky. 608, 87 S.W. 792 (1905).

